Jean Eid
ResearchWorking PapersPublicationsArticles
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ABSTRACT: This paper
examines the relationship between how hospital owner ship is organized
and the intensity of competition in the health care market. I study the
question using an empirical entry model. These models
typically exhibit multiple equilibria. To resolve this problem, a novel
algorithm that computes all the equilibria of the game is
developed. This paper uses the algorithm together with two different
equilibrium selection rules to estimate the parameters of
interest. My
findings suggest that for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals are
differentiated. I use my estimates to simulate two
counterfactuals. First, I study a market were only not-for-profit
hospitals exists. The results suggest a decrease in the level of health
services. Second, I study a market were not-for-profit firms do not
enjoy any tax shelters. I again find a decrease in the level of health
services. I conclude that mixed markets are beneficial to
consumers.
The most recent working paper version is available for download as a PDF file (272 Kb.)
ABSTRACT:
Our paper investigates the variation of winning bids in slave auctions
held in New Orleans from 1804 to 1862. Specifically, we measure the
variation in the price of slaves conditional on their geographical
origin. Previous work using a regression framework ignored the auction
mechanism used to sell slaves. This introduced a bias in the
conditional mean of the winning bid since it depended on the number of
bidders participating in the auction. Unfortunately, the number of
bidders is unobserved by the econometrician. We adopt the standard
framework of a symmetric independent private value auction and propose
an estimation strategy to attempt to deal with this omitted variable
bias. Our estimate of the mean number of bidders doubled from 1804 to
1862. We find the number of bidders had a significant positive effect
on the average winning bid. An increase from 20 to 30 bidders in an
auction raised the average winning bid by around 10 percent. The price
variation according to the geographical origin of slaves found in
earlier work continues to persist after accounting for the omitted
variable. We also find a new result that a considerable premium is paid
for slaves originating from New Orleans. However, this price variation
disappears once we account for regional productivity differences.
The most recent working paper version is available for download as a PDF file (443 Kb.)
The most recent
working paper version is available for download as
a PDF file (302 Kb.)
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